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REDEFINING FEDERAL LARGESS THROUGH STATE
MAXIMUM GRANT REGULATIONS:
DANDRIDGE v. WILLIAMS'
Every state in the Union participates 2 in the federally assisted program
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).3 Some twenty4
of the states, in an effort to lessen burgeoning welfare expenditures,5 have
placed an upper limit on aid an eligible family may receive under this
program. Maryland is one of these states.6 In Dandridge v. Williams the
Supreme Court of the United States considered for the first time the stat-
utory and constitutional bases for such maximum welfare grants. Spe-
cifically, the Court found Maryland's regulation to be a legitimate exer-
cise of state administrative policy and thus vindicated the general deploy-
ment of the maximum welfare grant by the states.
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program is one
of the four "categorical assistance" programs created by the Social Secur-
ity Act of 1935. 7 The purpose of the Act is to encourage
1 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
2 Id. at 472-73.
3 Social Security Act § 401 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 601-10 (Supp. V, 1969) amend-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (1964). Hereinafter all citations in text or footnote will be to
Title 42, unless otherwise noted.
4 397 U.S. at 481.
5 From 1960 to 1969 the cost of public assistance nationally has surged from $2.5
billion to more than $10 billion annually. Brozen, Toward An Ultimate Solution, SATUR-
DAY REV., May 23, 1970, at 30. The number of individuals receiving welfare in America
presently exceeds 12 million. Jones, Pressure Builds on California's Welfare System,
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 16, 1970, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1. The greatest portion of this
number are AFDC recipients. See 7 WELFAR rN REv., Sept.-Oct., 1969, at 32
Table L
6 See 8A MD. CODE ANN., art. 88A H9 44A et seq. (Michie 1969); MD. MAN. OF
DEP'T OF SOC. SERVIcEs, Rule 200 § X, Sched. B at 23 (1970), formerly MD. MAN. OF
DBP'T OF PUB. WELE. Pt. II, Rule 200 § VII, 1, at 20 (hereinafter cited as Rule 200 § X,
B); 397 U.S. at 474 n.4.
7 Ch. 531, H9 1 et seq., 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 301-1396 (Supp. V, 1969). The Social Security Act, as
amended, creates the following categorical assistance programs: Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. H§ 601-10 (Supp. V, 1969), amending 42 U.S.C.
H§ 601-09 (1964); Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. H9 302-06 (Supp. V, 1969), amending
42 U.S.C. H9 301-06 (1964); Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. H§ 1202-06 (Supp. V, 1969),
amending 42 U.S.C. H9 1201-06 (1964); and Aid to the Permanently and Totally
Disabled, 42 U.S.C. H§ 1352-55 (Supp. V, 1969), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55
(1964).
"Categorical assistance" is to be distinguished from "general assistance". "General
assistance" programs are financed solely on the state or local level. "Categorical as-
sistance" programs, which handle the bulk of public welfare monies, operate through a
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the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives
by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other
services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy de-
pendent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to
help maintain and strengthen family life.
8
Under the program, public assistance is granted to a "dependent child",
defined by the Act as a "needy child . . . deprived of parental support
or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent" who lives with one of a specified
list of relatives and is either under the age of eighteen or is under the age
of twenty-one and a full time student.0
While state participation in the AFDC program is voluntary, those
states "which desire to take advantage of the substantial federal funds
available for distribution to needy children are required to submit an
AFDC plan for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW)."'u This plan must meet certain requirements estab-
lished by HEW.". However, the states have ample latitude in assigning
AFDC resources, since each state may freely prescribe its own standard
of need and determine its level of benefits by the amount of funds it de-
votes to the program.
12
Maryland has adopted a schedule, which has been approved by HEW,
setting out its standards of need and designating what level of benefits
will be paid. 13 The schedule, like the schedules in other states, calculates
a family's standard of need as a dual function of the number of members
in the family and the income (less the family's present resources) re-
quired for such a family to meet the cost of necessities. As a rule, the
level of benefits under the schedule increases with each additional mem-
system of matching federal grants designed to encourage states to supply aid to con-
gressionally defined groups of needy individuals. See Note, Federal Judicial Review of
State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 84 (1967); see also Wedemeyer & Moore,
The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1966).
8 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. V, 1969).
9 Id. § 606(a).
10 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17, (1968), citing 42 U.S.C. 99 ,601-04
(Supp. V, 1969).
11 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V, 1969).
12 392 U.S. at 318-19.
13 The various states are free to encompass within their standard of need di-
verse items which other states do not include in assessing cost. There are also dif-
ferences with respect to what level of benefits a state chooses to pay. Four courses
of administration are possible: 1) grants may be made in full accord with the ascer-
tained need of eligible families; 2) each eligible family may receive a percentage of its
determined need; 3) grants may be made in full accord with the ascertained need of
eligible families but with a maximum upper limit on aid imposed; and 4) each eligible
family may receive a percentage of its determined need but with a maximum upper limit
on aid imposed. Maryland employs the third alternative. 397 U.S. at 473.
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ber in the family although the increments become progressively smaller.1 4
Maryland's Department of Social Services has also promulgated a "maxi-
mum grant" regulation which imposes a $250 per month upper limit
upon AFDC benefits payable to a family, irrespective of family size or
actual need.' 5  This grant limitation is not applicable to eligible mem-
14 See Rule 200. At the time this action was brought the following schedule (MD.
MAN. OF DEP'T OF PUB. WELFARE, Rule 200, Sched. A at 27) was in use for determining
subsistence needs, exclusive of rent:
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING COST OF SUBSISTENCE NEEDS
1 11 1 I 11 j IV V
Number of persons in Monthly 
costs when
assistance unit (include Heat, cook-unborn child as an Light and/ Heat with ing fuel Heat
additional person) No heat or or cooking or without and water and all
utilities fuel in- light heating utilities
included cluded included included included
with with with with with
shelter shelter shelter shelter shelter
1 person living:
Alone $51.00 $49.00 $43.00 $40.00 $38.00
With 1 person 42.00 41.00 38.00 36.00 35.00
With 2 persons 38.00 37.00 35.00 34.00 33.00
With 3 or more
persons 36.00 35.00 34.00 33.00 32.00
2 persons living:
Alone 84.00 82.00 76.00 72.00 70.00
With 1 other person 76.00 74.00 70.00 68.00 66.00
With 2 or more other
persons 72.00 70.00 68.00 66.00 64.00
3 persons living:
Alone 113.00 110.00 105.00 101.00 99.00
With 1 or more other
persons 108.00 106.00 101.00 99.00 97.00
4 persons 143.00 140.00 135.00 131.00 128.00
5 persons 164.00 162.00 156.00 152.00 150.00
6 persons 184.00 181.00 176.00 172.00 169.00
7 persons 209.00 205.00 201.00 197.00 193.00
8 persons 235.00 231.00 227.00 222.00 219.00
9 persons 259.00 256.00 251.00 247.00 244.00
10 persons 284.00 281.00 276.00 271.00 268.00
Each additional person
over 10 persons -_ 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50
Modification of standard for cost of eating in restaurant: Add $15 per individual.
Other schedules set the estimated cost of shelter in the various counties in Maryland.
See id., Sched. B-Plan A, p. 29; Sched. B-Plan B, p. 30. The present schedules,
which are substantially the same, appear in the Maryland Manual of Dept. of Social
Services, Rule 200, pp. 33, 35. 397 U.S. at 488 (App.).
15 Rule 200 § X, B. The Rule restricts to $250 per month the AFDC benefits
payable in selected counties including the city of Baltimore, the domicile of the plain-
tiffs. In all other counties the upper limit is $240. The question whether a state may
vary its schedule of need and benefit in accordance with the county of residence of
AFDC recipients has been raised but as yet remains undecided. Rothstein v. Wyman,
303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated and remanded, 398 U.S. 275 (1970).
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bers of a family who reside in another household or in a child care insti-
tution. 16
The plaintiffs-appellees are members of large families who are appli-
cants for, or recipients of, public assistance pursuant to the AFDC pro-
gram. They have brought suit for themselves and on behalf of the class
which they represent. Typifying the class is plaintiff Linda Williams
who lives with her eight children, ranging from four to sixteen years in
age. Her husband is absent from the home, she and one of her children
are in poor health, and the family is without any financial resources. Un-
der the state-determined standard of need, her family is entitled to bene-
fits amounting to $296.15 per month, but due to the imposition of the
maximum welfare regulation she receives only $250 per month.
17
The defendants-appellants are Edmund P. Dandridge, Jr., the head of
Maryland's Department of Social Services, and other welfare officials of
the state.' 8
The appellees asked a three-judge district court to declare invalid and
permanently enjoin the enforcement of the Maryland maximum grant
regulation. 19 They contended that the maximum grant limitation was not
only inconsistent with the Social Security Act of 1935 but also discrimi-
nated against large families who receive AFDC benefits in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
20
The appellees advanced the argument that the Maryland Department of
Social Services Rule 200, § X, B 21 was in fundamental conflict with the
Social Security Act, 22 and in particular with 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10), as
amended, which in pertinent part states:
16 Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Md. 1968).
17 Id.
18 Hereinafter all appellants will be referred to as "the state of Maryland".
'9 The court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), (4), 2281 (1964), and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). 297 F. Supp. at 453.
20 297 F. Supp. at 453.
21 The challenged regulation, Rule 200, § X, B reads as follows:
B. Amount-The amount of the grant is the resulting amount of need when
resources are deducted from requirements as set forth in this Rule, subject
to a maximum on each grant from each category:
1. $250-for local departments under any 'Plan A' of Shelter Schedule
2. $240-for local departments under any 'Plan B' of Shelter Schedule
Except that:
a. If the requirements of a child over 18 are included to enable him to
complete high school or training for employment (1ll-C-3), the grant
may exceed the maximum by the amount of such child's needs.
b. If the resources of support is paid as a refund (VI-B-6), the grant
may exceed the maximum by an amount of such refund. This makes
consistent the principle that the amount from public assistance funds
does not exceed the maximum.
c. The maximum may be exceeded by the amount of an emergency
grant for items not included in a regular monthly grant. (VIII)
3. A grant is subject to any limitation established because of insufficient
funds.
22 The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, operates to invalidate a
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A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children . . . must
provide . . . that all individuals wishing to make application for aid to families
with dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to families
with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals. (emphasis added) 23
It was contended that the phrase "all eligible individuals" applies not
merely to those who make application for aid under the program but to
the class of all "dependent" children, without regard to their sibling rank-
ing.24  The application of the state regulation, it was charged, effected a
denial of AFDC benefits to the younger children in large families.
25
Such a result was said never to have been countenanced either by Con-
gress or HEW.
26
The appellees also claimed that Maryland's maximum grant regulation,
instead of providing for family stability, tended to fractionate the family
unit.27  The Maryland regulation, appellees alleged, encourages a large
family on the AFDC program to maximize its benefits by "fanning out"
some of its "dependent" children with eligible relatives28 or agencies, a
course of conduct antithetical to the purpose of the AFDC program as
outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 601.
Further, Rule 200 § X, B was denounced for precipitating the denial of
assistance, regardless of determined need, to some of the children in large
families participating in the AFDC program. Such a regulation, it was
asserted, results in an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination under ei-
ther the traditional or "special scrutiny" tests of equal protection. 29
The district court, invoking jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act3a
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, initially held the Maryland regulation to be in
state law which "either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or impairs
the efficiency of those agencies of the Federal government to discharge the duties for the
performance of which they were created." See Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389
U.S. 235, 240 (1967), quoting Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
23 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. V, 1969).
24 Brief for Appellees at 56, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
25 Id. at 55.
26 Id. at 55-63.
27 Id. at 28.
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1964) as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 606 (Supp. V, 1969), which
reads in part:
(a) The term 'dependent child' means a needy child . . . who is living with
his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother,
stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of
residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home.
(c) The term 'relative with whom any dependent child is living' means the
individual who is one of the relatives specified in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion. ...
29 Brief for Appellees at 18-48, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4) (1964).
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conflict with both the federal statute and the equal protection clause.31
Subsequently,32 the district court filed a modified opinion which bottomed
the regulation's invalidity exclusively on the constitutional ground.
33
The state of Maryland appealed from the injunction granted by the
district court3 4 and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.35
After first reviewing the statutory grounds and discovering no support for
the appellees' position there,3 6 the Court found it necessary to consider,
and ultimately to reject, the existence of the constitutional impairment sug-
gested by the appellees. In reversing the district court Justice Stewart
wrote an opinion supported at large by the majority of a Court of eight
(Justice Blackmun was not then a member of the Court) .3 Justice Black,
with whom Chief Justice Burger joined, and Justice Harlan filed short
concurring opinions. Justice Douglas registered a dissent limited to the
statutory grounds alone, while Justice Marshall, speaking for himself and
Justice Brennan, dissented on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
In being called upon to review the construction given Subchapter IV of
the Social Security Act of 1935,38 particularly 42 U.S.C. § 602,39 the
Court treads on familiar but convoluted ground.40  In a companion case
decided the same day as Dandridge the difficulty in interpreting a subsec-
tion of the statute lent occasion for Justice Harlan to observe:
The background of [§ 602(a)(23)] reveals little except that we have before
us a child born of the silent union of legislative compromise. Thus, Congress,
31 297 F. Supp. at 459.
32 After the district court's first opinion was entered the state of Maryland lodged a
multi-faceted motion which the district court treated in essence as a motion to re-
consider.
33 297 F. Supp. at 459 (supplemental opinion).
34 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) a direct appeal to the Supreme Court may be
made following the granting or denial of a civil injunction by a properly convened
three-judge district court. Such an appeal is a matter or right. See Radio Corp. of
America v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 660, 664 (N.D. ]11. 1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 412
(1951).
35 Dandridge v. Williams, 396 U.S. 811 (1969).
36 The Supreme Court reviewed the statutory question since a reviewing court must
consider whether a judgment may be supported on any ground including those not re-
lied upon or considered by the trial court. The statutory question was reviewed first,
because were it to be resolved favorably to the appellees, it would be superfluous to
ruminate about the constitutional issue. 397 U.S. at 475-76 & n.6.
37 It may be assumed that Justice Blackmun would have sided with the majority in
Dandridge. In Wyman v. James, 39 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1971), another
AFDC case involving a questioned state regulation, Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion
which drew support from the Dandridge majority, and criticism from its dissenters.
38 Ch. 531, §§ 1 et seq., 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (Supp. V,
1969).
39 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V, 1969), formerly ch. 531, §§ 1 et seq., 49 Stat. 627
(1935).
40 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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as it frequently does, has voiced its wishes in muted strains and left it to the
courts to discern the theme in the cacophony of political understanding. 41
Justice Stewart rejects the argument that the Social Security Act pre-
cludes a state from employing a maximum grant regulation to limit the
amount of AFDC aid a family eligible for welfare might receive. Pri-
marily, he asserts that if the § 602(a)(10) requirement of provision for
"all eligible individuals" is read in conjunction with § 601, which gives
states latitude in meeting the Act's requirements, the maximum grant is
manifestly an acceptable method of balancing demands for public assist-
ance against the finite resources of a state's welfare budget. In addition,
he reasons, although maximum grant regulations may lead to the attenu-
ation of family bonds, they do not destroy them. It is destruction of such
bonds that contravenes the purpose of the AFDC program. Lastly, HEW
and Congress both have recognized and approved maximum grant regu-
lations.
Addressing himself to the question of whether Maryland's maximum grant
provision denies per capita benefits to the youngest children in the largest
families, Justice Stewart comments that "a more realistic view is that the
lot of the entire family is diminished because of the presence of additional
children without any increase in payments. '42  Whether such a per cap-
ita diminution in the family grant is compatible with the AFDC sections"3
is the question defining the ambit of Justice Stewart's opinion.
44
He relies upon language in King v. Smith45 stressing that a state is
free to set both its standard of need and the level of benefits for its AFDC
program. In envisaging King as a necessary concomitant of § 601 of
the Act, which requires a state to furnish aid "as far as practicable under
the conditions in such State", Justice Stewart is noticeably willing to give
a state almost free rein in the distribution of its available AFDC funds. 40
Justice Stewart points out that in light of an expressed Congressional
concern for keeping children within the nucleus of their family the states
must develop responsive welfare programs.47 Since Maryland's resources
are limited, it can choose either to "support some families adequately
and others less adequately, or not give sufficient support to any family." 48
41 397 U.S. at 412.
42 397 U.S. at 477. Justice Stewart notes that it cannot be gainsaid that it was
the grant of the last child which was wholly rescinded rather than that of the first
child. "In fact, it is the family grant that is affected." Id. at 477-78.
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (Supp. V, 1969) amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964).
44 397 U.S. at 478.
45 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).
46 397 U.S. at 478.
47 Id. at 479.
48 Id. This is an interesting way to describe Maryland's alternatives. It is readily
apparent that those receiving "less adequate" support would in fact obtain less money
than those who received "not sufficient" support.
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He concludes a state may, consistent with the language in § 602(a) (10),
follow either course and still comply with the dictates of the federal law
as "long . . . as some aid is provided to all eligible families and all eligible
children." 49
We see nothing in the federal statute that forbids a State to balance the stresses
which uniform insufficiency of payments would impose on all families against
the greater ability of large families-because of the inherent economies of scale-
to accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments. The strong policy
of the statute in favor of preserving family units does not prevent a State from
sustaining as many families as it can, and providing the largest families somewhat
less than their ascertained per capita standard of need. 50
Justice Stewart recognizes that family bonds may be stretched by the
"farming out" of children in an attempt by some large families to mini-
mize the effect of the maximum grant upon their per capita AFDC
awards. Illustrative of how the appellee Williams could disband part of
her family and thus maximize her welfare benefits is the following excerpt
from the opinion of the district court:
If Mrs. Williams were to place two of her children of twelve years or over
with relatives, each child so placed would be eligible for assistance in the amount
of $79.00 per month, and she and her six remaining children would still be
eligible to receive the maximum grant of $250.00. 5 1
Of course, the district couri has employed the essential, but probably
correct, assumption that Mrs. Williams and others similarly situated are
versed with knowledge of the state welfare regulations and also have eligi-
ble relatives willing to take into their family an additional child or two. 52
Justice Stewart does not quarrel with this assumption. He notes that eli-
gible relatives for such "farming out" must have a kinship tie with the
dependent children. The nature of permissible kinship relations is spelled
40 Id. at 481.
50 Id. at 479-480. It is also noted by Justice Stewart that the maximum grant
provision causes only one-thirteenth of Maryland's AFDC families to receive less than
their determined need. See Maryland Dept. of Social Services, 1970 Fiscal Year
Budget which projects that were Maryland to allocate an identical amount of funds
under a percentage limitation rule, there would be no AFDC family which would
receive monies equal to its ascertained level of need. This is correct but does not
truly reflect the situation. Under a percentage limitation every AFDC family might,
for example, receive 95% of its need while families to whom a maximum grant applies
may receive funds covering only 75-859o of its scheduled need. This is the situation of
the plaintiffs as outlined in Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Md.
1968). Id. at 480 n.10.
51 397 U.S. at 501 (Douglas, J., dissenting) quoting 297 F. Supp. at 453.
52 This is probably a reasonable assumption since a family requiring AFDC aid is
likely to both inquire about how to receive more aid and obtain feedback from other
welfare recipients. The fact that the family requires public assistance in the first
place indicates they have no relatives willing and capable of lending financial assistance.
Those relatives who are eligible for AFDC assistance would be more than happy to
bring several dependent children and the attendant money grants into their home.
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out in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a). Where a § 606(a) relationship exists, Justice
Stewart accepts such "farming out" of dependent children as technically
legitimate. 53
Finally, Justice Stewart buttresses his view authorizing the imposition of
maximum grant regulations with: (1) the position taken by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) in approving Maryland's
maximum grant regulation for more than twenty years, and (2) the ac-
tions of Congress in noting the existence but failing to excoriate the appli-
cation by the state of maximum grant limitations on AFDC benefits.6
4
In his dissent Justice Marshall decries the Maryland plan as nothing
less than a declination of subsidies for the support of certain dependent
children whom the state itself has classified as aid-qualified. The maxi-
mum grant regulation is criticized as a stricture unrelated to the calcula-
tion of need, premised upon an unwarranted "economies of scale" ration-
ale, and which transgresses the federal-state AFDC funding formula. An
incidental and unpermitted function of the maximum grant is the fraction-
ation of the large AFDC family in its attempt to maximize benefits.
Lastly, both HEW's and Congress' views concerning maximum grant
limitations are characterized as either unknown or not directly applicable
to Maryland's regulation.
The dissent of Justice Marshall makes clear his belief the words of the
Act should be strictly construed. Noting that the phrase "aid to families
with dependent children" appears numerous times in the Act," and is
defined, inter alia, as "money payments with respect to . . .dependent
children",5" he states that nowhere in the AFDC Title is a state empow-
ered to arbitrarily select from the class of needy dependent children those
to whom it will provide aid.57  Yet just such an occurrence is, he sub-
mits, the operant result of a maximum grant which cuts off monetary as-
sistance to those children who are the seventh and succeeding members of
an eligible family.5"
Justice Marshall declares that in no wise is the maximum grant regu-
lation related to calculation of need,59 and further asserts that Justice
Stewart is plainly wrong in his belief that large AFDC families are better
able than small AFDC families to accommodate their needs to diminished per
capita payments due to the "economies of scale". In the instant case, Mary-
land has already computed the level of need for the large family with the
53 "The kinship tie may be attenuated but it cannot be destroyed." 397 U.S. at 480.
54 Id. at 481-83.
55 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. V, 1969) is the most important section where
it is found.
56 Id. § 606(b).
57 397 U.S. at 510-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 509-10 n.2.
59 Id. at 509.
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thought in mind that because there are numerous family members a per capita
deduction to compensate for the purchasing economy of the group is in or-
der.6 0 Therefore, Justice Marshall reasons, to justify the use of a maximum
grant regulation by decreasing only the per capita benefits of members of large
families under the guise of economies of scale is to promote arbitrariness
in awarding aid under state-defined need schedules.
Justice Stewart finds the "arbitrariness" he is accused of promoting to
be permissible under the Social Security Act. Having posited that the
family rather than the individual is the actual recipient of welfare benefits,
and recognizing that the Social Security Act favors the preservation of
family units, he suggests that with the limited amount of funds Maryland
has devoted to its AFDC program, a maximum grant is the best means of
insuring that the greatest number of families are provided with their ascer-
tained standard of need.61 The conclusion is even more accurate and
perhaps more fair than it appears, considering the extant possibility of
large families "farming out" their children, but is bottomed on the ques-
tionable enthymeme that arbitrariness in a regulation is justified where the
greatest good is obtained for the greatest number.
The economies of scale attribution argument appears vulnerable to
attack on other grounds. It manifests an attempt by a state to circum-
vent the problem of ascertaining with specificity the measure of need for
large families receiving AFDC benefits. Also the marginal utility of
AFDC monies is higher for the large AFDC families from whom the mon-
ies are taken than for the smaller AFDC families amongst whom the mon-
ies are redistributed. The result is economic loss for large AFDC fam-
ilies. 6
2
Moreover, Justice Marshall recognizes that ultimately it is inconsistency
with the intent of Congress and not arbitrariness which measures whether
a promulgated regulation falls outside the scope of its enabling legisla-
tion.63
60 It would be worth evaluating whether the magnitude of this deduction is well
considered since the very condition of being poor might in part have been brought on
and maintained by the parties' lack of buying expertise. But see 42 U.S.C. § 605 (1964),
which reads in part: ". . . the State agency may provide for such counseling and guid-
ance services with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other
funds by the relative receiving such payments as it deems advisable ......
61 397 U.S. at 480.
62 Economists have generally accepted the theory of the declining marginal utility
of money. See P. SAMUELsON, ECONoMics 427-29 (6th ed. 1964). One can safely
surmise that a state in calculating its level of need for families of differing sizes strives,
albeit unintentionally, to establish a uniform level of marginal utility. The imposition
of a maximum grant tips the balance of marginal utility in favor of small AFDC
families. Cf., Note, AFDC Income Attribution: The Man-In-The-House and Welfare
Grant Reductions, 83 HARv. L. Rlv. 1370, 1375-76 (1970).
63 397 U.S. at 517 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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A closer look need be taken at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) which pro-
vides that aid "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals."64 Justice Marshall construes the phrase "all eligible individ-
uals" to mean "all needy dependent children" and would thus require a State
AFDC payment schedule to provide for at least a minimal allotment to each
needy child. 65 On the other hand, Justice Stewart feels that there is no reason
why under this provision an individual standard of need must be met in full so
long as some aid is given the family. Both Justices recognize that parents in
families receiving assistance under this federal-state program will distribute
whatever grant they receive so as to accord benefit to all their children.10
It is not reasonable to conclude that where a child's level of benefits is
scheduled at a higher dollar value than the limit set under a maximum grant
that the amount of assistance the child receives necessarily must be zero.
Since the parents undertake to distribute the grant in every instance, a
more rational approach, as suggested by Justice Stewart, would be to con-
sider the individual level of benefits to have been diminished on a pro rata
basis.6 7 Indeed, it seems proper to conclude that the existence of a
maximum grant regulation in a state has in most instances little bearing
on whether state aid was given to "all eligible individuals".
A more persuasive argument against the maximum grant system fol-
lows from Justice Marshall's examination of the formula s used to deter-
mine the federal share of funds devoted to a state's AFDC program.
Federal funds comprise $22 of the first $32 given a recipient, with all
additional funds supplied by the state.69 In Maryland the state spends
on the average about $40 per recipient per month.70 The total federal
subsidy is based upon "the total number of recipients of aid to families
with dependent children."'71 No limitation is placed upon the number of
members in any family unit for whom the state is paid a federal subsidy.
A state continues to receive this subsidy for every dependent child even
though, due to the operation of a maximum grant regulation, none of the
subsidy is passed on for the benefit of the additional dependent children
64 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. V, 1969) (emphasis added).
65 397 U.S. at 511 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 477-78 (majority opinion), 511 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is meaningless
to suggest, as does Justice Douglas, that the statute is contravened where parents take
increments of the payment, intended for their older children, and distribute them to
their younger children since this is aid by the parents and not by the state. Even when
there is no maximum grant present, the parents must make a similar distribution among
their children in order to compensate for the fact that the level of benefit schedule for
each additional child in the family becomes progressively lower. Id. at 502.
67 Id. at 477-78.
68 42 U.S.C. § 603 (Supp. V, 1969).
69 397 U.S. at 512 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70 Id.
71 42 U.S.C. § 603 (Supp. V, 1969).
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in large families. There is thus effected a transference from the state to
the federal government of a proportionately greater burden of support
as family size increases. 72 Justice Marshall adjudges it inimical to the
intent of Congress for the Court to lend approval to the depriving of a
needy dependent child of the benefit of the incremental part of the federal
subsidy paid on his account.73 The position is sound but does not disal-
low the application of a maximum grant to situations where a dependent
child receives the full amount of his federal subsidy but little or no state
aid.
Another charge leveled against the maximum grant regulation by Jus-
tice Marshall is that it conflicts with the purpose of the Social Security Act
by providing a powerful economic incentive to break up the family in or-
der to maximize welfare benefits. 74 This possibility is not merely spec-
ulative, 75 but, as was pointed out earlier, Justice Stewart asserts there
must exist at least a kinship tie between those children who are "farmed
out" and the relatives who take them into their homes if the directive of
the Act is to be followed. An unclaimed benefit of the "farming out"
arrangement is the maximization of the amount of welfare assistance a
state pays which inheres to the benefit of all needy persons within the
state. When a large family divides itself the total per capita benefits it
receives often are greater than they would be in the absence of a maxi-
mum grant regulation because increases in the level of benefits decrease
progressively with each additional member of the family unit. Of course,
this pecuniary advantage must be weighed against the child's loss of a
badly needed "mother-father" figure. Confronted with such alternatives,
a society unwilling and barely able to increase welfare must view the false
economic choice as more critical than the maintenance of family unity.
76
Justice Marshall is convinced that neither HEW nor Congress has
adopted a position authorizing the maximum grant. It is significant, he
argues, that both the opinions of the Secretary of HEW and the intent of
Congress are, if not latently disapproving of maximum grant regulations,
at best, unclear.
Justice Stewart deems the act of the Secretary of HEW in approving
Maryland's public assistance program 77 with its maximum grant provi-
72 Justice Marshall relates the intriguing possibility of how a family with eleven
or more members could, under Maryland's maximum grant, turn a "profit" for the state
since the state would receive more in federal subsidy than the $250 it pays to the
family. 397 U.S. at 513 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 514 n.6.
76 Cf. Elman, If You Were on Welfare, SATURDAY REv., May 23, 1970 at 27.
77 HEW must approve federally funded state public assistance plans. 45 C.F.R.
§ 201.3 (1970) provides that the state plan must:
be submitted currently so that the Commissioner may determine whether the
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sion as supportive of a Department position favoring at large such
grants. 78 Coupled with this approval has been HEW's acceptance of
maximums imposed on family grants by some twenty other states. More-
over, a HEW publication has expressly recognized the use of maximum
grant systems.
79
The position of the Secretary of HEW in this case is unknown, Justice
Marshall counters, because, contrary to the Court's admonition to the
district courts to seek wherever possible the views of HEW,80 the Su-
preme Court itself failed to ask HEW to submit a brief detailing its
views.8 ' Further, a reading of this decision makes it clear that at least
five Justices support the position that approval of state administrative
plans by HEW is not a binding administrative determination of compli-
ance with the Social Security Act.8 2 Only after a thorough review of
HEW activities in relation to Maryland's dollar limitation on AFDC
grants did the district court conclude "the various actions and inactions
on the part of HEW are not entitled to substantial, much less to decisive
weight in our consideration of the instant case."8s3 This sentiment was
echoed in the concurring opinion by Justice Black who felt even though
the Secretary of HEW has found state and federal welfare provisions con-
sonant, an individual welfare recipient is entitled to attack in court any as-
pect of the state's welfare plan as inconsistent with the provisions of the
Social Security Act.84 Furthermore, HEW has been extremely reluctant
to challenge state welfare plans which may be operating at odds with fed-
eral law and policy.8 5 In fact, during HEW's and its predecessor's thirty
years of administering Social Security programs there have been only six-
teen conformity hearings ordered.8 6 Indeed, the position that HEW ap-
proves the use of maximum grants seems questionable.
plan continues to meet Federal requirements and policies.
... (d) Basis for approval. Determinations as to whether State plans (includ-
ing plan amendments and administrative practice under the plans) originally
meet, or continue to meet, the requirements for approval are based on relevant
Federal statutes and regulations and the requirements and policies set forth in the
Handbook of Public Assistance Administration and other official issuances to the
States.
78 397 U.S. at 481. He also notes that the majority of states pay less than the
designated need requirement.
79 Id. at 482 n.14; HEW, STATE MAXIMUMS AND OTHER METHODS OF LIMInNo
MONEY PAYMENTS TO RECIPIENTS O SPECIAL TYPES OF PUBLIc AssIsTANcE 3 (1962).
80 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970).
81 397 U.S. at 515 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82 The five are Justice Black, concurring, with whom Chief Justice Burger joined,
and the three dissenters, Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan.
83 Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 460 (D. Md. 1968).
84 397 U.S. at 489 (Black, J., concurring). It is worth noting that Justice Black
wrote his concurring opinion solely to raise this particular point.
85 See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, supra note 7, at 91.
86 See W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHMDREN 223 n.33 (1965).
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Justice Marshall mentions but does not detail several alternative ex-
planations why Congressional reference to the deployment of maximum
grant regulations by the state does not automatically imply approval of
the practice: (1) If Congress had permitted the states to interpose max-
imum grant restrictions on AFDC assistance, it would have been obvious.
(2) There is no indication that Congress, if indeed it approved the use of
maxima, focused on the family maximum rather than some other type of
maximum. (3) Congressional reference to maxima was disapproving and
directed solely toward ameliorating their harsh effects. (4) By piecing to-
gether the entire fabric of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program it becomes manifest that Congress clearly did not grant legisla-
tive sanction to the maximum. (5) The Court in King v. Smith8 7 con-
strued the intent of Congress in the AFDC program to be the promotion
of economic security and protection for all eligible children.
88
Only short shrift need be given the first two explanations; they are bald
conclusions constructed without supporting arguments. It can as easily
be said that if Congress had not permitted the states to employ maximum
grants, it would have been obvious; or that Congress, if it did 'approve the
use of maxima, failed to distinguish the family maximum. In fact, the
validity of the first two explanations is best measured by a consideration
of the other suggested explanations. In this regard Justice Marshall ap-
pears content to defer to Justice Douglas' dissent which focuses with in-
tensity in this area.
The dissent of Justice Douglas stresses that the clear purpose of the So-
cial Security Act is the aiding of "each individual recipient". In addition,
he emphasizes the point that the provisions of the Act and its amend-
ments have consistently excluded any subsidy limitations based upon fam-
ily size.
The state of Maryland contended that "eligible individuals" as de-
scribed in § 602(a) (10) of the Act is a reference to the applicants for
aid and not individual family members.89  Justice Stewart agrees with
the state but finds it unnecessary to consider the argument since in any
event it is the family unit which receives the AFDC grant. 0  Justice
Douglas, however, devotes considerable space to demonstrating that, in
actuality, it is the individual family member whom § 602(a)(10) de-
scribes.9 '
Justice Stewart's conclusion that a maximum grant regulation affects
family, not individual grants, is critical to his resolution of the question
87 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
88 397 U.S. at 517 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 481 n.12.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 494-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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whether § 602(a)(10) is being violated.92  Instead of being forced to
determine if total deprivation of aid to the more recently arrived children
in large families chaffs against the purpose of the federal program, Justice
Stewart need only decide if a per capita diminution in aid can be justified
within the perimeters of the statute. He holds that such a diminution is
permissible under federal law and, drawing support for his conclusion
from King v. Smith,0 3 proclaims: (1) a state has great latitude in setting
its level of welfare benefits, and (2) Congress has recognized the limited
resources that a state may devote to public aid.94
In King the Court was presented with the question whether a "substitute
father" regulation of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security
which prohibited the making of any "AFDC payments to the children of
a mother who 'cohabits' in or outside her home with any single or mar-
ried able-bodied man"' 95 was consistent with the provisions of Subchap-
ter IV of the Social Security Act96 and with the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. 97 Chief Justice Warren, enunciating the view
of eight members of the Court, declared the Alabama regulation invalid
because it was inconsistent with § 602(a)(10) and with federal policy.
The constitutional issue was not reached.98
Justice Stewart believes the decision of the Court in King is distinguish-
able from the present case. 99 The "substitute father" regulation in Ala-
bama prohibited the making of any AFDC payment to children of a
mother who cohabits with any able-bodied man. This clearly violated §
602(a)(10) of the Act by not providing aid to "all eligible individuals",
in this case the cohabiting mother's children. The instant case is different
in that all eligible children are given financial assistance through their
family, albeit pro-rated since the amount receivable is governed by an
upper limit.
On the other hand, after noting that Mrs. Williams' plight is in essence
no different from that of the plaintiff in King, Justice Douglas implies that
Dandridge and King are indistinguishable. King stands for the proposi-
tion, he argues, that states are not free to distribute funds in a fashion in-
92 It is also critical to the consideration whether equal protection has been afforded
members of large families.
93 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
94 397 U.S. at 478 citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
95 392 U.S. at 311.
96 Ch. 531, §§ 1 et seq., 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (Supp. V,
1969).
97 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1: "... No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . .deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
98 392 U.S. at 313.
99 397 U.S. at 477.
[Vol. 4
NOTES
consistent with the Act.100 In Dandridge, as in King, Justice Douglas
finds a state plan which completely denies aid to some eligible individuals
contrary to the provisions of § 602(a)(10). Where two separate plans
suffer from the same infirmity, they must be dealt with in the same man-
ner. The regulation in King was held invalid; the regulation in Dan-
dridge must also be struck down.
Justice Stewart, however, relies upon manifested Congressional intent
to rebut the assumption upon which Justice Douglas' conclusion is based:
that maximum grant regulations give no aid at all to younger children in
large families. He describes the desire of Congress in enacting the AFDC
Title was to provide aid to dependent children through the medium of
the family. "From its inception the Act has defined 'dependent child' in
part by reference to the relatives with whom the child lives."' 0 ' The
Congressional fervor for maintaining dependent children within the family
structure was such, he declares, that it amended the law in 1967 to per-
mit AFDC aid for children whose need arose solely from their parents'
unemployment. 10 2
Justice Stewart feels Congressional approval was lent to state maximum
grant limitations by the enactment in 1967 of two amendments to the So-
cial Security Act which recognized their existence. One amendment re-
quired a state to adjust any maximum grant limitations it employed to
fully reflect changes in living cost.' 03 The other limited medical assist-
ance benefits to those families whose incomes did not exceed 133-1/3%
of the highest amount of AFDC aid paid to a family of the same size with-
out any income, but made provisions for adjustment where a maximum
grant limits payments to families of more than one size.
10 4
The observation of Justice Douglas is that although Congress has ac-
knowledged the existence of maximum grant regulations, its focus seems
to have been exclusively directed toward ameliorating the harsh results of
their application.10 5 In 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)106 Congress, in re-
100 Whether a state has the authority to pay less than its ascertained standard of
need, however, has strangely enough never been directly decided. Id. at 492 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). In the case at hand the question revolves around the permissibility of
a maximum welfare grant which happens to be less than the state assessed welfare
standard. Of course, the very purpose of a maximum grant is to create this exact situa-
tion. But the possibility can be envisaged where a state ascertains the levels of need
for large families to be identical despite small differences in the number of family
members.
101 Id. at 479.
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. V, 1969).
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1969).
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (f) (Supp. V, 1969).
105 397 U.S. at 506.
106 A 1967 Amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23) (Supp. V, 1969) provides in part:
[T]he amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have
been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were
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quiring the states to adjust their welfare schedules to reflect changes in
cost of living, mandated that any maximums must also reflect a propor-
tionate adjustment. The context was not one of approval of maximums
but merely an attempt to preserve the integrity of the bill. The same can
be said of the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f) 10 7 which prevented the
extension of maximum grants into the Medical Assistance Title. Justice
Douglas finds it difficult to infer from these statutory references to the
maximum grant that, as the state of Maryland suggests,108 Congress im-
plied approval of the practice. It is arguably more difficult, however, to
infer Congressional disapproval of maximum grants from legislation whose
central thrust was the placing of limits on the use of such grants. A better
reading of the amendments leads to the conclusion that Congress has recog-
nized maximum grants and found them appropriate in some circumstances.
Somewhere in between the state of Maryland's posture-that AFDC aid
need not meet every individual's standard of need as long as some aid is
provided to all eligible families and all eligible children-and the mandate
of the appellees-that each individual child entitled to AFDC aid must re-
ceive funds commensurate with his state's designated level of benefit-lies
the fallow middle ground first explored by Justice Marshall. Advocates
from both sides could be partially accommodated by a determination that
each child eligible for AFDC assistance must receive funds totaling at
least the incremental amount of the federal subsidy paid the state on his
account despite the imposition of a maximum grant limitation. As an in-
cidental advantage this view would result in the reconciliation of §§ 602
(a) (10) and 603 of Title 42, which respectively require that some aid
be provided to all eligible dependent children and assign the level of the
federal subsidy per dependent child.
Notwithstanding that Maryland's Rule 200, § X, B was accepted by
the majority of the Court as a valid exercise of state administrative policy
under the auspices of the Social Security Act, the regulation must pass
muster as well under the scrutiny of an equal protection inquiry.
It is clear that a state may not adopt for the distribution of its AFDC
funds a system the purpose or effect of which is to invidiously discrimi-
nate against a class of welfare recipients. Use of such a system would be
a patent violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to
families will have been proportionately adjusted. (emphasis added).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f)(2) (Supp. V, 1969). The new addition to the Medical
Assistance Title reads:
If the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare] finds that the operation
of a uniform maximum limits payments to families of more than one size, he may
adjust the amount otherwise determined . . . to take account of families of dif-
ferent sizes.
108 Brief for Appellants at 18-21, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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Amendment. 09 There are two standards of judicial review used to de-
fine invidious discrimination, however, and Dandridge marks the initial
determination by the Court of the standard it will apply in public welfare
cases involving maximum grant regulations.
The Equal Protection Clause has been traditionally interpreted by the
Court to void state legislative or administrative regulations which have no
rational basis. A legitimate classification established under such regula-
tions must reasonably comport with the stated purpose of the regula-
tion." 0 The "traditional" guideline used by the Court, and as set out in
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company,"' is governed by the still valid
principle that under our system of government it is the legislative branch
which decides the merits of and need for laws dealing with economic
problems and social conditions. The principles of the Lindsley decision
by which economic regulations are to be tested are:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of
the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is
done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely ar-
bitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is
called in question, if .any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essen-
tially arbitrary. (emphasis added)
112
A statute which discriminates is not necessarily unconstitutional although
it "affects the activities of some groups differently from the way in which it
affects the activities of other groups."". 3 Under this test the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes only those discriminations which are arbitrary and
unreasonable in providing no sound reason for distinguishing between simi-
larly situated individuals and according some disparate treatment."14
There are a number of cases, however, which find the traditional yard-
stick for measuring equal protection to be inappropriately short." 5 The
Court has "long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties
are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully con-
109 397 U.S. at 483.
110 E.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 93 (1965); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
111 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
112 Id. at 78-79.
113 Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs., 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
"4 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
115 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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fined." 116  Only a "compelling state interest" will justify the infringe-
ment of such a fundamental right. 117 The Court has also found that special
concern should be given classifications based upon criteria such as nation-
ality," 8 status,119 wealth, 120 or race.121
The appellees in the instant case have taken the position that the proper
standard of review is the standard set out in Shapiro v. Thompson.122 They
suggest that Maryland's maximum grant regulation infringes on basic and
fundamental rights and can be upheld only if it can be shown to be neces-
sary for the achievement of a "compelling" governmental interest. They
further allege the regulation promotes no such interest. Indeed, they as-
sert that it does not even comply with the traditional standard for equal
protection.1
23
The state of Maryland counters with the assertion that Rule 200, § X,
B meets the criteria of the "traditional" test of equal protection. Mary-
land's exercise of its legislative power is claimed to possess a rational ba-
sis as: (1) a work incentive, (2) a way to avoid disincentives to family
solidarity, (3) a limitation on state assumption of parental child support
obligations, (4) a means of maintaining equity between welfare and wage-
earning families, and finally, (5) a method of allocating limited state funds
to fully meet the needs of the largest possible number of families. 12"
The district court below held the Maryland rule to be "invalid on its
face for overreaching"'125 and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
116 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
117 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Some of the fundamental
rights which have been recognized as such by the Court are: the right to an education,
the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right to vote and the right to travel.
For an excellent discussion of these and other rights see Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
11s Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyoma v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
119 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
120 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
121 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
122 394 U.S. 618 (1968) (equal protection denied where public assistance made
contingent upon the applicant's having lived within the state for the prior year).
Shapiro stated that:
[Tlhe traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification ...
touches on [a] fundamental right ...its constitutionality must be judged by the
stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Id. at 638.
123 Brief for Appellees at 18, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
124 Brief for Appellants at 32-41, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
125 297 F. Supp. at 468. The Court uses "overreaching" as an equivalent of
"overbreadth", a concept of recent vintage first decanted by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
[Tlhe doctrine was meant to apply only in the limited area of first amendment
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"[b]ecause it cuts too broad a swath on an indiscriminate basis as ap-
plied to the entire group of AFDC eligibles to which it purports to ap-
ply.,"12
6
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Court, takes issue with
the district court's finding of "overreaching". To him "overreaching"
has significance in conjunction with the protection of freedoms guaran-
teed by the First Amendment but not in the consideration of state regula-
tions in the social and economic field. The instant case, he states, is not
concerned with problems of "overreaching" and First Amendment rights
and therefore the Court must employ, as it has in the past, the traditional
equal protection test governing state social and economic regulations.127
Any disparity in benefits from the state-determined schedule of benefits
payable to an AFDC family caused by the state's imposition of an upper
limit on assistance does not constitute a per se violation of equal protec-
tion. If the state's classification is possessed of some "reasonable basis",
then it is an appropriate exercise of the rule-making function.128
The conclusion to be drawn from Dandridge is that whether the right to
welfare is "fundamental", heretofore an unsettled question, has been re-
solved in the negative. A second conclusion can be extrapolated from the
majority view, namely, where welfare aid is provided by the state there
exists no fundamental right to benefits equalling either one's scheduled level
of need or level of benefits.
A consideration of whether public assistance is a "fundamental" right is
not sidetracked by arguing that welfare is a privilege rather than a right.
The distinctions recently drawn between the two concepts in constitu-
tional law are inexact and uncertain even in those situations where the
Court feels compelled to sweep clear a line.129  In addition, the constitu-
tional challenge remains essentially unanswered where a "right-privilege"
dichotomy is raised.' 30
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
adjudication. It constituted nothing more than the Court's recognition that when
the terms of a statute affecting first amendment rights sweep so broadly as to
proscribe not only unprotected, but also constitutionally protected conduct, such
a statute is incompatible with our tradition of uncompromising deference to these
"preferred" freedoms. Comment, Judicial Rewriting of Overbroad Statutes: Pro-
tecting the Freedom of Association from Scales to Robel, 57 CALIw. L. REv.
240-241 (1969).
126 297 F. Supp. at 469.
127 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968), the Supreme Court specifically
avoided deciding whether welfare is a "fundamental" right by straining to find a one
year state residency requirement to be a violation of the fundamental right to travel.
128 397 U.S. at 485.
12) See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 I-HAv. L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
130 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
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being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unem-
ployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.' 3 '
A number of authorities echo this sentiment.132 Assuming, arguendo,
that welfare is a right, Justice Stewart nevertheless does not believe it is a
"fundamental" one.'
33
The appellees contended that the "right of procreation" is a funda-
mental right infringed upon by Maryland's maximum grant regulation
since the effect of the regulation is the limiting of procreation in AFDC
families. As authority they cited Skinner v. Oklahoma, 34 a case in which
a state compulsory sterilization law containing an arbitrary classification
was invalidated because it violated this fundamental right. Justice Mar-
shall admits that the "right of procreation" is affected marginally and in-
directly at best by the maximum grant regulation. He does note, how-
ever, that it is difficult to conceptualize a person whose survival depends on
his welfare check, but who, having been denied welfare, takes solace in the
knowledge that his First Amendment rights have been preserved.' 35
Once a state begins to provide welfare benefits to eligible individuals it
has been intimated that a duty arises to continue aid in accordance with
the state-scheduled standards and not to place a limit upon such assistance.
Thus the expectation of welfare benefits by the recipients has been likened
to that of a rescuee in tort.1'3 However, to the extent that such a duty
exists, it is a child of Congress.137 The Dandridge majority certainly ap-
pears unwilling to give it Constitutional dimension.
Justice Marshall is in complete disagreement with the Court's approach.
He sees no reason why, although Dandridge falls within the parameter of
"economics and social welfare", the Lindsley test should necessarily per-
tain. Nor does he feel equal protection analysis is advanced significantly
by a definition of a right as "fundamental" a priori.'38 Rather than char-
acterize the case as fitting within the perimeters of either the "traditional"
131 Adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, G.A. Res. 217A(III),
U.N. Doc. A/811 1948.
132 See, e.g., Note, Welfare Due Process: The Maximum Grant Limitation on the
Right To Survive, 3 GA. L. REv. 459 (1969); Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and
Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB. L. REv. 210 (1967); Graham, Public Assistance: Tie Right
to Receive; the Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 451 (1968).
133 "[Plublic welfare assistance . . . involves the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings . . . but we can find no basis for applying a different con-
stitutional standard." 397 U.S. at 485.
134 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
135 397 U.S. at 520 n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 See Harvith, supra note 132 at 243 (1967).
137 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970).
138 397 U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J.q dissenting).
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or "fundamental right" tests of equal protection, he favors employing a
standard which would concentrate on "the character of the classification
in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discrimi-
nated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and
the asserted state interests in support of the classification."'139
Support for Justice Marshall's attack of the "fundamental right" test is
found in another quarter, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. Justice
Harlan sees no basis for requiring selected statutory classifications to be
justified by a "compelling" state interest in order to pass muster. He
would make rationality of classification the standard for all equal protec-
tion decisions, with the exception of racial classifications.'
40
Justice Marshall expresses the operative effect of the maximum grant
regulations to be the creation of two classes of needy children and two
classes of dependent families-those families and their members which are
small and those which are large.' 41 Persons who are eligible for assist-
ance should not receive different treatment, he concludes, unless there ex-
ists a relevant distinction between them, and further, any statutory dis-
tinction made between classes "must be based on differences that are rea-
sonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found.'1
42
Assuming, as does the majority, that the main purpose of the Maryland
plan is to encourage those on welfare to seek employment, Justice Mar-
shall faults the maximum grant regulation of Maryland because it creates
classes which are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. The class of
individuals to whom AFDC payments are made is grossly under-inclusive
because only the needy children in small families receive full AFDC pay-
ments while it is only the heads of large households who are being forced
by the statute to seek employment.' 43  The maximum grant regulation is
also over-inclusive because people are included in the class who are incap-
able of work and some families were already large before the maximum
grant took effect.
1 44
139 Id. at 521.
140 Id. at 489. A complete discussion of Mr. Justice Harlan's views concerning equal
protection is found in his dissenting opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
659 (1966).
141 It is immaterial whether the maximum grant is considered to operate only
against the youngest members of large families or the family itself (benefits received
being shared equally by all) since the support for either class is reduced below mini-
mum subsistence levels. 397 U.S. at 518 n.11.
142 Id. at 519, quoting Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
143 397 U.S. at 519, 527 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 526-27. It should be noted, however, that Maryland's maximum has
been approved by HEW since 1947. Thus the argument is that the class is over-
inclusive for large families already in existence in 1947. Since children may receive
AFDC aid only until they reach the age of 21, there would be no family fitting in this
category.
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Where, as in Maryland, a classification is shown to be both under and
over-inclusive, Justice Marshall feels the state should be compelled to pre-
sent a persuasive justification for the classification. 145
So long as some justification is shown for Maryland's maximum grant
regulation it meets the traditional equal protection test of Lindsley. In
fact, Justice Stewart says the Court "need not explore all the reasons that
the State advances in justification of the regulation" 140 provided the
state's action is "rationally based and free from invidious discrimina-
tion."1' 47
The majority considered only two stated purposes of Maryland's maxi-
mum grant regulation: to encourage employment and to avoid discrimi-
nation between welfare families and the families of the working poor.
Maryland keyed its maximum AFDC grant to the state minimum wage 48
in order to create an equitable balance between household heads who
worked and those who did not.149
Maryland also coupled with its upper limit on AFDC benefits the per-
mission for recipients of largeness to retain a portion of incidental mon-
ies earned without any reduction in AFDC benefits. There are, how-
ever, many AFDC families within the state who have no employable
member; and other AFDC families who receive grants to which a maxi-
mum was inapplicable. Yet, despite these incidents displaying an absence
of employment incentive, Justice Stewart, citing Lindsley, concludes "the
Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all."'50
He rephrases the sentiments of Justice Harlan in Rosado v. Wyman that it is
"no business of this Court to evaluate . . . the merits or wisdom of any
welfare programs."' 51
It is worth noting that the initial reason propounded by the state of
Maryland for the use of a maximum grant was economic. The District
Court described Maryland's policy as an attempt "to fit the total needs of
the State's dependent children, as measured by the State's standards of
145 Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 348 (1949).
146 397 U.S. at 486.
147 Id. at 487.
148 Justice Stewart notes that the minimum 40-hour weekly wage in Maryland is
$46-$52. This is not much different from the present federal minimum wage of
$52-$64 per 40-hour week. 397 U.S. at 486 n.19.
'-49 In doing so Maryland relies on the theory of "less-benefit". This theory holds
that monies receivable under a public assistance program should not exceed the income
of the lowest paid worker in the community. The English New Poor Law of 1834
first propounded this concept. Brief for Appellees at 20, Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970).
150 397 U.S. at 486-87.
151 397 U.S. 397, 422 (1970).
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their subsistence requirements, into an inadequate state appropriation."'1 52
After defeat at the trial level, Maryland apparently realized that its eco-
nomic rationale would not withstand a serious constitutional challenge.
Its arguments before the Supreme Court were the product of its search for
additional justifications.'
53
Where benefits are necessary to sustain life the Court has typically given
the reasons behind classifications close constitutional scrutiny.'5  Here,
Justice Marshall observes, children are being distinguished on a basis over
which they have no control-the number of their brothers and sisters;'
55
the reasons for the maximum grant regulation as argued by the state do
not apply equally to all members of the class of eligible AFDC recipients
and do not significantly advance state interest; a federal program already
provides a work-incentive; 15   and the state's interest could be as well
served by alternative measures calculated to be less destructive of indi-
vidual interests. 157 An appraisal of these arguments when reflected against
the reasons urged by Maryland in favor of its maximum grant regulations
leads one to fairly question the correctness of the majority position even
under the Lindsley standard. 15 8
Two alternatives to the maximum grant which would afford AFDC re-
cipients equal protection are: (1) pro rata deductions in individual wel-
fare benefits,' 5 9 and (2) increasing the amount of state funds devoted
to the AFDC program so that grants are made in full accord with ascer-
tained need. Only the first alternative is operative within the status quo
of states with limited funds but it is doubtless an approach more favored
by the members of the Court than the maximum grant.' 60 The United
States Government has also registered its preference for this proposal.
152 297 F. Supp. at 458 (emphasis added).
153 397 U.S. at 524 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'54 Id. at 522.
155 Id. at 523. It is suggested by Justice Marshall that the present classification
is comparable to the classification between illegitimate and legitimate children which
the Supreme Court struck down in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. The real measure of the validity of a classifi-
cation, however, is not the lack of control people have over their classification-this
is the case with most classifications-but the arbitrariness of the classification itself.
156 Work Incentive Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-44 (Supp. V, 1969).
157 397 U.S. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158 E.g., If "farming out" results in a state expending more funds than it would in
the absence of a maximum grant regulation, how can the regulation be said to be
"rational"?
159 If a percentage reduction were substantial, however, this could, in turn, place
an unequal burden on small families, less able to spread expenses. Memorandum for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
160 This conclusion may be drawn from the statement of Justice Stewart, which
reads: "We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise, that it best
fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that Maryland might ideally es-
pouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." 397 U.S. at 487.
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A decision not to allocate from a state's resources to its poor all they need can
never be a comfortable one; making that decision in terms of a percentage formula,
however, not only is probably more fair as among the various recipients of as-
sistance, but also makes quite plain the character of the decision being made-
and so quite possibly increases political pressures against it, and a willingness to
forego other possible uses of state resources in order to avoid or reduce to a
minimum the cuts made.1 61
It is the opinion of the majority in Dandridge that "the intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public
welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court."' 02  The
decision may be viewed as a reflex action against the steadily intensifying
involvement of the federal judiciary in the review of state welfare proce-
dures.' 6 3 But even though the Court feels the complexity in the operation
of public assistance programs makes them a more proper subject for di-
rect HEW supervision, it is unlikely that any immediate turn of events will
occur.
The reticence of HEW in challenging state welfare plans operating at
odds with federal law and cutting of federal funds to states not comporting
with federal law is well documented.6 4  This augurs the bringing of yet
more welfare litigation. But even were HEW to cut off a state's funds for
non-compliance, this conceivably could serve as a springboard to an action
alleging denial of equal protection to innocent welfare recipients.' 65
Dandridge itself does not resolve completely the question whether all maxi-
mum grant regulations are permissible. The decision adjudicates the validity
of a maximum grant as applied to an AFDC family's benefits, but leaves unan-
swered the question whether an individual maximum grant will be allowed
to stand.' 66 This question may soon face the Court; a resolution consistent
with the thinking of Dandridge must be expected.
New and continuing attacks on welfare provisions should not be unex-
pected. A recent article helps point the direction and the difficulties of a
trail that may be followed:
The path of educating the judiciary to the plight and needs of the poor is an
arduous and tortuous one. This can only be done in well-chosen and well-planned
cases.
On the more fundamental issue of the amount of the grant, the attack should be
three-fold: The utilization of special grant provisions, . . . the exploration and use
of Section 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act requiring adjustments in grants in
161 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970).
162 397 U.S. at 487.
163 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. at 422 n.23.
164 See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLtJM. L. Rav.
84, 91 (1967).
165 Harvith, supra note 132, at 216-17.
166 397 U.S. at 516 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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accordance with the rise in the cost of living; and finally the use of the Equal
Protection Clause to challenge arbitrary maxima, percentage or family, on levels of
assistance. All of these may seem rather piecemeal and not designed to guarantee
an adequate grant. One may ask, why not a plain old-fashioned due process
attack on the adequacy of the grant? My objection is purely tactical. The time is
not right and a suit would be counter-productive.'67
The time, surprisingly enough, may be right even if a version of President
Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP) or a negative income tax were to be
enacted.' 68 Under either program the federal government would guarantee
present AFDC recipients a subsistence schedule of payments; the state could
elect (or may be compelled) to increase this schedule by adding state funds.
Were a state to impose a family assistance ceiling on its private funds under
one of these programs the courts might view this new legislation as an ex-
tension of the present "bramble bush" and would hopefully, like the man in
the Llewellyn poem,169 leap back in again.
W. Michael Mayock*
167 Albert, Choosing the Test Case in Welfare Litigation, 2 CLEARINGHOUSE RnvIEW
28 (Nov. 1968).
168 A comprehensive analysis of both the FAP and the negative income tax may
be found in Welfare, Time for Reform, SATURDAY REV., May 23, 1970, at 19, and
Richardson, In Search of Fairness in Welfare, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 15, 1970, § F
at 3, col. 1.
109 There was a man in our town
and he was wondrous wise:
he jumped into a BRAMBLE BUSH
and scratched out both his eyes-
and when he saw that he was blind,
with all his might and main
he jumped into another one
and scratched them in again.
K. N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1960).
* This note is dedicated to the memory of Welbum Mayock and Welburn S. Mayock.
